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Proportional Heuristics in Time Tradeoff 
and Conjoint Measurement
PEEP F. M. STALMEIER, PhD, THOM G. G. BEZEMBINDER, PhD, 
IVANA J. UNIC, MD
The time-tradeoff (TTO) test is widely used to measure quality of life for different health 
states. Subjects are asked to equate the value of living a given period in an inferior health 
state to the value of living a shorter period in good health. Applications of TTOs have been 
criticized based on the fact that the value of future life duration is taken as the future life 
duration itself. The authors show that for a health state in which a subject does not want to 
live longer than a specified amount of time, subjects' responses do not comply with the 
assumption that the value of the period in inferior health is equated to the value of the shorter 
period in good health. Actually, preference reversals with respect to such a health state point 
to the use of a proportional heuristic in the TTO test. Comparisons of the TTO test in these 
subjects with category scaling and difference measurements also favor a proportional inter­
pretation of the TTO test. In tests based on conjoint measurement, these subjects also 
appear to use a proportional heuristic. Consequences of the use of the TTO test and conjoint 
measurement in quality-of-life models are discussed. Key words: utility assessment; QALY; 
conjoint measurement; preference reversals; compatibility effect. (Med Decis Making 
1996;16:36-44)
In medical decision making, the concept of quality- 
adjusted life years (QALYs) is of considerable im por­
tance. It involves the m easurem ent of utilities of health 
states and life durations. Let (L,Q) denote  living Lyears 
in the ("constant") chronic state of health  Q, followed 
by immediate death. The prevailing evaluation U(L,OJ 
of (L,OJ goes by the multiplicative m odel
U(L,Q) = V(L) X W(Q)
where W(Q) evaluates well-being in state of health  Q 
and V(L) denotes the appreciation of life years. The 
factor W(Q) constitutes the “quality w eight” of V(L). 
The aim of the TTO test is to assess W(OJ.
The TTO test is a popu lar m ethod  to elicit utilities 
for health states. It was in troduced  by Torrance et aL1 
and has been applied by several o ther investiga­
tors.2™4 In the  TTO test, the  subject or patien t is p re ­
sented with a period Y of inferior hea lth  Q, and one 
elicits the n u m b er X of healthy life years, X <  Y, con­
sidered equivalent to (Y,Q).5 The resulting num ber X 
is called the 7TO equivalent. We consider two possible 
interpretations of the num bers V(L) that play a crucial 
role in the assessm ent of W(Q).
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IfX healthy life years are equated, i.e., d eem ed  equiv­
alent, to Y years in health state Q, then, accord ing  lo 
the multiplicative model, V(X)Wihealthy) = V(Y)W(Ori. 
Setting W(healthy) equal to 1, W(OJ equals V(X)/V(Y). In 
the first interpretation, V(L) is taken as the identity,
i.e., V(L} = L. Following this interpretation, W(Q) re­
duces to X/Y. Thus, the ratio X/Y is taken as a m easure  
W(Q) of the utility of health state Q, and  (L,Q) is a p ­
preciated  by L X W(Q). This in terpretation of th e  TTO 
test prevails in medical decision making.1,0
The second interpretation ttikes V(L) as a n o n lin ea r  
function of life years that reflects the com m on  feeling 
that life years in the neeir future are more valuable 
than life years in the  distant future. Now W(Q) is taken 
as V(X)/V(Y). In this case, W(Q) is called an adjusted  
quality weight because it reckons with a n o n lin ea r  
appreciation  of life years. (L,Q) is now  ap p rec ia ted  by 
V(L) X W(Q).2"4,B,?
An exam ple shows that the ad justm ent c a n  be of 
considerable m agnitude. A typical apprec ia tion  of life 
duration  is dep ic ted  by the cuived line in figure L 
Following this cuive, the appreciation of living ton
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healthy years is 0.7, while that of living 30 healthy years 
is equal to 1. Now suppose th a t 30 years in hea lth  state 
Q are considered equal to ten years of healthy life. The 
quality weight based on V as the  identity, show n as 
the diagonal line in figure 1, is the  X/Y ratio 10/30, or 
0.33; however, the  adjusted quality  weight, obtained 
from the curved line4 in figure 1, is 0.7, resulting in  a 
positive adjustm ent of 0.37. Clearly, the  d iscrepancy 
between the effects of these tw o in terpre ta tions is d is­
turbing because it may lead to different decisions w ith  
respect to therapy choice.
In the sequel, we suggest th a t ad justm en t is not 
correct. We report a preference reversal that suggests 
that a significant proportion of OLir subjects use  a p ro ­
portional heuristic. Furtherm ore, w e com pare the 
quality weights from the two in terpre ta tions of the 
TTO test with quality weights of o ther com m only used  
m ethods to elicit quality w eights for health  states, 
namely category scaling and difference m easurem ent. 
This com parison also argues for the use of a p ro p o r­
tional heuristic. The latter evidence is only c ircum ­
stantial because them is no "gold standard" with which 
to com pare utilities and  because there  is no accepted  
theoiy to link the quality w eights from different elic­
itation m ethods. Finally, an ensu ing  hypothesis co n ­
cerning the interpretation of conjoint m easu rem en t 
(see below) is tested and confirmed.
PREFEREN CE REVERSALS FOR M E T  H EA LTH  STATES
We consider the results of the  TTO test for a health  
state in which a subject does not w an t to live longer 
than a fixed am ount of time, called the “m axim um  
endurable time” (.MET).8 Living with metastasized breast 
cancer can be such a health state. W om en are asked4* 
w hether or not they prefer living 25 years w ith m e­
tastasized breast cancer (25,M) to living 50 years w ith 
metastasized breast cancer (50,M). Both the (50,M) and 
(25,M) outcom es are unrealistic because the ten-year 
survival rate for m etastasized breast cancer is only 
10%. Here, however, we are in terested  in the choice 
behavior, of OLir subjects, Let us take a closer look at 
the women who preferred (25,M) to (50,M). In o rd er to 
be consistent with their preferences for the  shorter 
life duration in the m etastasized state, these w om en 
should have assigned a smaller TTO equivalent to (50,M) 
than to (25,M). However, the TTO equivalents tu rned  
out to be severely inconsistent w ith  the preference for 
the shorter life duration and instead  com plied w ith  a 
constant proportional tradeoff. We in terpret this find­
ing, first reported in Stalmeier et al.a as a preference  
reversal, since the TTO equivalent is h igher for (50,M) 
than for (25,M), w hich suggests a preference for (50,M), 
contradicting the choice of the preference for (25,M).
We interpret these observations as inconsistencies of 
choice. We argue on the basis of these  observed choice 
inconsistencies that the TTO equivalents do no t reflect 
simple preferences for MET health  states. Instead, the  
subjects use w hat we will call a proportional heuristic. 
If subjects use a proportional heuristic, th en  th e  qual­
ity weights should  not be ad justed .
COM PARISON W IT H  CATEGORY SCA LIN G  A N D  
D IFFER EN C E M EA SU R EM EN T
We calculated two TTO quality weights, ad ju s ted  
and unadjusted . As explained above, the  u n ad ju s ted  
qtiality weight is the proportion X/Y. The adjusted quality 
weight is calculated using a function  V(L) as m easu red  
with 50/50 certainty equivalent gam bles for life d u ra ­
tion.4 We com pared  these  two TTO quality w eights 
with quality weights derived from cat ego ly  scaling an d  
from difference m easurem ents. W ith categoiy scaling, 
subjects are asked to generate  a n u m b er  betw een  0 
and 10 to express their evaluations of a (50,Q) outcom e. 
This num ber is a quality weight an d  is com pared  w ith  
the two TTO quality weights.
With difference m easurem ents,10 subjects choose the 
laiger of the differences (50,healthy) — (50,Q) and  (50,OJ
-  (1 month,Q). Setting (50,healthy) =  1 a n d  (1 m onth , 
Q) — zero, we thus p robe w h e th e r  (50,0j is ap p rec ia ted  
as being closer to (50,healthy) th an  it is to (1 m onth , 
Q), that is, we probe w h e th e r  W(Q) is valued >0.5 o r  
<0.5. Provided the two TTO quality w eights fall on  
different sides of 0.5, the result of the  difference m ea ­
surem ent can differentiate be tw een  the  two TTO qual­
ity weights. For instance, if the  u n ad ju s ted  and  a d ­
justed TTO quality weights are 0.33 and  0.7 w hile th e  
difference m easurem ent weight is larger than  0.5, then  
the latter res Lilt forms a plea to use  the ad ju sted  TTO 
weight. If the  u n ad ju s ted  and  ad justed  rFTO quality 
weights are 0.6 and  0.8 while the  difference m easu re ­
m ent weight is larger than  0.5, then  the  difference 
m easurem ent gives no cue for choosing  betw een the  
adjusted and unad justed  quality w eights.
C O N JO IN T  M E A SU R EM EN T
Conjoint m easurem ent (CM) is a m e th o d  of rep re ­
sentational m easurem ent, and  is u sed  here  to assess 
utility. As such, it has recently b een  app lied  to p ro b ­
lems related to laryngeal can ce r  an d  breast can-
cer., 11- is
*We are indebted to Lia Verhoef for suggesting Ihe selection 
criterion. It enabled us to detect the preference reversal, albeit that 
the suggestion was made for another reason.
In CM, the format of the questions is th e  sam e 
as in the TTO test, for instance, th e  subject is asked 
to choose betw een (Y,Q) and  (X,h e a l  thy), w here  X <  Y. 
A difference is that in CM (Y,Q) m ay  be com pared  w ith  
(X,Q'), w here Q' is a health  state o th e r  th a n  “healthy .” 
Another difference is that in CM, th e  questions for (Y,Q) 
are in terspersed in a random  o rd e r  be tw een  questions 
related to o ther health  states (spaced presentation). 
With a TTO, for a given (Y,Q), the  interview er ad justs  
X until the subject expresses indifference; th L is ,  w ith
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Table 1 • Numbers of Subjects in the Tests Using the Various Methods
No. of 
Subjects
Subjects 
Preferring 
(25,M) 
to (50,M) Gamble
TTO* Test
Conjoint
Measurement Cate­
gory
Scaling
Differ­
ence
Measure­
ment
12
Questions
8
Questions Longt Shortj:
Experiment 1 19 16 16 16 8 16 16
Experiment 2 29 17 17 17
Experiment 3 38 17 38
*TTO = time tradeoff. 
f270 choices.
$60 choices.
the TTO, the questions concerning (Y,Q) are p resen ted  
as a block (massed presentation). For a m ore detailed 
explanation of CM in medical decision making, see 
Maas.14
Because identical preference questions are asked in 
TTO tests and  CM, it seems plausible to hypothesize 
that similar heuristics are used in TTOs and  CM. A 
linear relation between the tradeoffs from the two 
methods w ould  suggest that this is the case.
Method
Three experim ents were done to collect the nec- 
essaiy data. Experiment 1 collected extensive data  u s ­
ing all m ethods. In Experiment 2, additional subjects 
were tested to investigate the preference reversals an d  
the relation betw een conjoint m easurem ent an d  TTOs. 
In Experiment 3, additional data  on the preference 
reversals were obtained in a classroom setting*
EXPERIMENT 1
i
Subjects
Nineteen wom en, 20 years old or older, partic ipa ted  
in Experiment 1.A11 subjects were students. M ost w ere 
majoring in psychology, some in law. Each subject, 
once selected, received $15.
Procedure
Written health-state descriptions containing the 
physical, psychological, and social consequences for 
three health states, namely living with m etastasized  
breast cancer, living after prophylactic m astectom y, 
and living w ith genetic counseling, were p repared . The 
interviews w ere on an individual basis. In the selection 
phase, which took about 10 m inutes, a subject w as 
told that she participated in a pilot study concern ing  
decision m aking by women w ho have an increased  
risk for breast cancer due to familial histoiy. The su b ­
ject read the health-state description of living w ith  
metastasized breast cancer, and  was selected for fur­
ther participation if she preferred (25,M) to (50,M). In 
that case, the o ther two health-s tate descriptions w ere 
handed  out. Subjects were asked to read the  health- 
state descriptions carefully at hom e and im agine as
vividly as possible how  these health  states w ould  affect 
their personal lives. The test sessions were on three 
separate days, each  session lasting about 50 m inutes.
TTO Test
We obtained  the num ber of healthy life years that 
the subject considered  equivalent to Yyears in inferior 
health. This n u m b er is the TTO equivalent, deno ted  
by X. T he  num ber X is obtained w ith a bracketing 
p rocedure  involving forced choices between a du ra ­
tion X in  perfect health  and a fixed longer duration  Y 
in inferior health.5 After each statem ent of a choice by 
the subject, the interviewer changed the value of X, for 
instance, X was increased if the subject preferred (Y,Qh 
This w as repeated until the subject expressed indif­
ference. The starting num ber X was chosen  random ly 
within th e  range of zero to Yyears in o rder to m inim ize 
anchoring effects. The subjects were carefully in ­
structed that there were no right or w rong ¿vnswers 
and tha t their answ ers should reflect their own pref­
erences. The questions were adm inistered on a com ­
puter screen.
The TTO test was adm inistered w ith four du ra tions  
Y, nam ely 5, 10, 25, and  50 years, for the three health  
states, am ounting  to 12 (L,Q) outcom es. These ou t­
comes w ere adm inistered in a random  order to each 
subject separately. The TFO test was administered twice 
over separate  sessions. Only the  results of the second  
test are d iscussed  because the first test was m ean t to 
familiarize the subjects with the procedure. This last 
test is deno ted  by TTO, 12 questions, in table 1.
Gambles fo r  Healthy Outcomes
The subjects w ere confronted w ith  a choice be­
tween living a certain  num ber of years Y and  a 50/50 
gamble to live either 50 years or 1 m onth . In all o u t­
comes, th e  quality of life was healthy. Via a bracketing 
procedure, Y was varied until the subject expressed  
indifference. The final num ber Y0iS is the  certainty  
e q u iv a le n t .  S e t t in g  V (50 ,healthy) = 1 a n d  (1 
m onth,heal thy) =  0, we obtain V(Y0 J  =  0.5. Next, the 
certainty equivalent for a 50/50 gamble with Y0mS and  
one m o n th  as outcom es was m easured, resulting in 
the n u m b er  of years Y0 5 with a utility of 0.25. Repeating 
this p rocedure  w ith  50/50 gambles, using certainty  
equivalents obtained earlier as outcomes, certainly
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equivalents were m easured w ith  utility values of 0.125,
0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625, 0.75, and 0.875. For instance, Y0 625 
is the certainty equivalent w ith  a utility of 0.625, ob­
tained from the 50/50 gamble w ith  Y0-75 and  Y0 5 as 
outcomes. A variation of the gam ble m e th o d  (not re ­
ported) was also used. The two gam ble m ethods w ere 
presented in two separate sessions.
Conjoint M easurem ent
Conjoint m easurem ent questions w ere of the  form 
“which do you prefer: 20 years w ith  prophylactic  m a s ­
tectomy or 15 years in genetic counseling?” Life d u ­
rations are chosen from the o rd e red  set {l m onth , 8 
years, 16, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 42, an d  55 years}, Health 
states were chosen from the o rdered  set {metastasis, 
prophylactic mastectomy, genetic counseling, an d  
healthy}. With 10 X 4 attribute levels, 780 different 
paired com parison are possible. Trivial com parisons 
such  as: "which do you prefer: 23 years in com plete 
health or 8 years w ith m etastasis” can be om itted b e ­
cause the first pa ir  is better on bo th  the  health-state  
and the duration dimensions. Thus, 270 nontrivial 
paired com parisons remain. These com parisons are 
presented in a random  o rd e r16 on  a co m p u te r screen. 
The comparisons are evenly divided over the  three  
sessions. This test is denoted  by CM, long in table 1.
Category Scaling
The subjects w ere asked: “Iiow  d o y o u  rate the (50,Q) 
outcome on a scale from 0 to 10?" It was explained 
that the outcom e (50, heal thy) h ad  a m agnitude of 10 
and that the outcom e (1 m onth,healthy) h ad  a m ag­
nitude of zero. The categoiy rating  is com m only used  
as a quality weight. Categoiy scaling w as done at the  
end of the third session.
Difference M easurem ent
In the difference m easurem ent, the  subjects w ere 
asked: "which difference is the  larger: the difference 
(50,healthy) — (50,Q) or the difference (50,Q) — (1 
month,Q)?” The result establishes w h e th e r  the  quality 
weight for Q is larger or sm aller than  0.5. Difference 
m easurem ents w ere done at the end  of the third ses­
sion.
EXPERIM ENT 2
Subjects
Twenty-nine wom en, 20 years old or older, pa rtic ­
ipated in experiment. All subjects w ere  students. Most 
were majoring in psychology. Each subject, once se­
lected, received $5.
Procedure
The interviews were on an individual basis. The test 
session lasted about 40 m inutes. The subjects partic ­
ipated in the TTO test and a sh o rten ed  CM test, d e ­
noted in table 1 by CM short. In the  CM test, 60 n o n ­
trivial questions w ere asked w ith  du ra tions  a n d  hea lth  
states from the o rdered  sets {5, 10, 14, 17, 20, 23, 25 
years} and  {m etastasis, p ro p h y la c tic  m astec to m y , 
healthy}.
EX PERIM EN T 3
Subjects
Seventy-six high school s tuden ts  w ith  a m ean  age 
of 17,5 years participated , Of these, 38 girls served as 
subjects, the o ther half played the  role of interviewer.
Procedure
In a classroom setting, two health -sta te  descrip tions 
concerning prophylactic m astec tom y a n d  m etastasis 
were read. The TTO questions w ere w ritten  on  paper. 
Four durations, 5, 10, 25, and  50 years, w ere used , 
am ounting to eight (LVQ) outcom es. The bracketing 
m ethod was adm inistered  by the  interviewers. This 
TTO test is deno ted  by TTO 8 questions in table 1. 
After the test, the subjects w ere asked to indicate 
w hether they preferred (25,M) o r (50,M).
Analysis
PR EFER EN CE REVERSALS FO R  M E T  H E A L T H  STATES
We determ ined the  n u m b er  of subjects w h o  p re ­
ferred the (25jM) to the (50,M) ou tcom e. For these su b ­
jects, we detennined the number's of subjects for w hom  
the (50,M) TTO equivalents w ere  larger, equal to, an d  
smaller than the (25,M) TTO equivalents. X/Y ratios for 
the metastasis outcom es w ere d e te rm in ed  to assess 
their proportionality.
COM PARISON W IT H  CATEGORY SCA LIN G  A N D  
D IFFER EN C E M E A SU R EM E N T
For the TTO data, the u n a d ju s te d  quality w eights 
were the  ratios X/Y. The ad justed  quality w eights were 
calculated as follows. For each sub jec t in Experim ent
1, the utility function V(L) for the life d u ra tio n  was 
established by the gamble m ethod . This utility func­
tion was fitted w ith  a power, logarithm ic, exponential, 
or logistic function. The best-fitting function, in  a least- 
squares sense, was u sed  as V(L), The ad ju s ted  quality 
weight was equal to V(X)/V(Y).
We com pared quality w eights for only one (50,Q) 
outcome. If the  ad justm en t d id  n o t lead to a change 
in the quality weight of m ore than  0.1, then  no result 
is reported, because a com parison  w o u ld  m ake little 
sense given the  limited reliability of the m ethods. Of 
course, sizeable adjustm ents were found only for those 
subjects for w hom  V(L) was substantially  nonlinear. 
Furthermore, the  ad justm en t w as largest lor the  w orst 
health state, due  to a ceiling effect (see figure 1). For 
these reasons, ad justm en ts  are largest for the  m etas-
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Table 2 • Time Tradeoff X/Y Ratios
Group
No. of 
Subjects
Years with Metastasis
5 10 25 50
NoMET* 21 0.576 0.721 0.715 0,745
Inconsistent 37 0.476 0.557 0.557 0,545
Consistent 13 0.286 0.238 0.138 0.041
* Subjects preferring living 50 years with metastasized breast cancer (50, M) 
to living 25 years with metastasized breast cancer (25,M). For these subjects, 
metastasis is not a maximum-endurable-time health state.
CM equivalents. Thus, in Experiment 1, there w e re  24 
X 2(durations) — 48 paired  comparisons. In E x p e r i ­
ment 2, 17 subjects com pared  two health  states, m e ­
tastasis an d  prophylactic mastectomy, each with a  d u ­
ration of 25 years, with (X,healthy). Thus, in Experim ent
2, there  w ere  17 X 2 = 34 pairs of TTO and C M  
equivalents. Therefore, combining Experiments 1 a n d
2, 82 cases of paired equivalents w ere analysed* T e n  
cases w ere discarded because of transitivity violations*
MEDICAL DECISION MAKING
tasis health state. Accordingly, that health state is u su ­
ally chosen for comparison of its two TTO quality 
weights with the weights from o ther m ethods. The 
difference m easurem ent method determ ines w hether 
the quality weight of Q is more or less than 0.5. For 
discriminating between the two TTO quality weights; 
we note that the two TTO weights can be com pared 
with the difference measurement only if they straddle 
the 0.5 value point.
C O N JO IN T M EASUREM ENT
In Experiment 1, the (L,Q) outcomes in the CM ques­
tions were taken from the sets {l m onth , 8 years, 16, 
20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 42, and 55 years} and {metastasis, 
prophylactic mastectomy, genetic counseling, healthy}. 
A subset of these questions is the same in the TTO 
test. For the purpose of a com parison between TTO 
and CM in Experiment 1, it is reasonable to assum e 
that the 25- and 50-year durations in the TTO test have 
the same utility as the 26- and 55-year durations in 
the CM test. Consider, for example, the outcome (26,PM), 
This outcome is paired with each of the outcom es in 
the set {(23,healthy), (20,healthy), (16,healthy), (8,healthy), 
and (1 month,healthy)}, nam ed set A, Suppose the sub- 
ject has a TTO equivalent for (26,PM) of 19 healthy 
years. In that case, it is natural to assum e that in set 
A, the first two outcomes will be preferred to (26,M) 
while the last three outcomes will n o t be preferred. In 
other words, the set of preferences corresponding with 
set A will be {1,1,0,0,0}, where 1 (0) m eans that the 
corresponding outcom e in set A is preferred (not p re ­
ferred) to (26,PM). In this case, the CM equivalent of 
(26,PM) was taken as the m ean of 16 and 20 healthy 
years. The CM equivalents were regressed on the cor­
responding TTO equivalents. We hypothesize that 
nonlinear associations between these outcom es will 
no t be significant. If the  set of preferences correspond­
ing with set A is, e.g., {1,0,1,0,0}, transitivity is violated 
an d  no com parison is possible. In the  CM test, 55 years 
was used  because the life expectancy of our subjects 
was about 55 years.
In Experiment 1, eight subjects compared three health 
states, metastasis, prophylactic mastectomy, an d  ge­
netic counseling  w ith (X,healthy). For the 26-year d u ­
ration as well as the  55-year duration, there were 
8(subjects] X 3(health states) = 24 pairs of TTO and
Results
Table 1 indicates for each experim ent how m a n y  
subjects participated for each m easurem ent m e t h o d .  
It follows from this table that a total of 86 s u b j e c t s  
partic ipated  and that 50 subjects preferred (25,M )  la  
(50,M).
PR E F E R E N C E  REVERSALS FO R M ET HEALTH S T A T U S
In Experim ents 1, 2, and  3, 50 of 86 subjects p r e ­
ferred (25,M) to (50,M). We expected tha t these s u b j e c t s  
w ould  assign lower T rO  equivalents to the (50,M) o u t ­
come than  to the (25,M) outcome. Contraiy to  o u r  
expectation, 37 of the 50 subjects (p <  0,001) a s s i g n e d  
longer life durations to the (50,M) outcome. W e c a l l  
these 37 subjects inconsistent: the da ta  of these s u b ­
jects entail a preference reversal. We call the o t h e r  13 
subjects consistent because they h ad  lower or e q u a l  
TTO equivalents for (50,M). Six of these consistent s u b ­
jects assigned TTO equivalents close to or often e q u a l  
to zero to all four pairs of life durations with m e t a s ­
tasis.
The 36 remaining subjects preferred (50,M) to (2 5 ,iv n . 
We call these  subjects noMEV because for these s u b ­
jects, m etastasis is not a MET health state.
Of the 36 noMET subjects, 21 (see table 1, E x p e r i ­
m ent 3, 38 — 17 = 21) participated in the TTO t e s t .  
These 21 noMET as well as the 37 inconsistent s u b j e c t s  
had remarkably stable X/Y ratios for the 10-, 25-, a n d  
50-year m etastasis outcomes, as show n in table Z* D i s ­
regarding the  X/Y ratio for (5,M), the X/Y ratios a r e  
constant, as tested by linear and quadratic c o m p a r i ­
sons. The X/Y ratios for the consistent subjects w e n ?  
significantly lower, as evidenced by a linear c o m p a r ­
ison (F(l,12) = 15.45, p <  0.002).
C O M PA R ISO N  W ITH CATEGORY SCALING AND 
D IF F E R E N C E  M EASUREM ENT
For each  subject in Experiment 1, w e com pared  t h e  
two quality weights from the  TTO test, adjusted a n d  
unad justed , with the quality weights from both c a l f * '  
goiy scaling and the difference m easurem ent. T lic m *  
were 16 subjects in Experiment 1 for w hom  all r e l e v a n t  
data were available. At the end of Experiment 1, o n e  
additional subject changed her m ind  with r e s p e c t  to
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Table 3 • Quality Weights Obtained with Three Methods
Quality Weight with Time 
Tradeoff (TTO) Quality Weight with Other Method*
Outcome^ Group§Unadjusted Adjusted
Category
Scaling
Difference
Measurement
Subject 1 0.26 0.71 0.45 - >0.5 + (50, M) I
Subject 2 0.30 0.69 0.30 - <0.5 - (50, M) I
Subject 3 0.44 0.82 0.40 - <0.5 - (50,M) I
Subject 4 0.59 0.89 0.35 - <0.5 NAt (50, M) I
Subject 5 0.24 0.88 0.40 - <0.5 - (50,PM) C
Subject 6 0.34 0.74 0.50 - <0.5 - (50,M) I
Subject 7 0.16 0.49 0.30 - <0.5 NA (50, M) I
Subject 8 0.54 0.44 0.40 + <0.5 + (50, M) I
Subject 9 0.66 0.76 0.40 - <0.5 NA (50, M) I
Subject 10 0.68 0.86 0.70 - >0.5 NA (50,PM) C
Subject 11 0.48 0,63 0.55 - >0.5 + (50,M) I
Subject 12 0.60 0.78 0.75 + >0.5 NA (50,GC) C
Subject 13 0.84 0.96 0.85 - >0.5 NA (50,GC) X
* ~ quality weight from category scaling or difference measurement more/less similar to adjusted TTO than to unadjusted TTO. 
tNA = comparison of quality weight from difference measurement with TTO not applicable because TTO weights do not straddle 0.5. 
■\M metastasis, PM = prophylactic mastectomy; GC = genetic counseling.
§l = inconsistent; C = consistent; X = noMET (see text).
the  selection criterion, w hich requires preference of 
(25,M) over (50,M). Her data are also u sed  here. Visual 
inspection of the utility functions for life duration  re ­
veals that 13 are concave, 2 diagonal, 1 convex, and  1 
logistic. The latter case is d iscarded  because the TTO 
quality weights from this subject are e ither 0 or 1. The 
two diagonal cases are discarded because ad justm en t 
has no effect (see figure 1). O ne concave case is d is­
carded because the corresponding TTO quality weights 
are close to 1, also resulting in  ad justm en ts  tha t are 
too small.
Table 3 shows the data for the  rem aining subjects. 
For Subject 5, the  (50,PM) ou tcom e was chosen b e ­
cause it fulfils ¿ill requirem ents. For Subjects 10 and  
12, the TTO equivalents for m etastasis are equal or 
close to zero, leading to too-small ad justm ents; th e re ­
fore, other outcom es are chosen. For Subject 13, the 
metastasis weights are almost equal to the GC weights; 
therefore, the m ore realistic (50,GC) outcom e is ch o ­
sen.
The product-m om ent correlations betw een quality 
weights from categoiy scaling and  the  ad justed  and  
the unadjusted  quality weights from TTO are 0.45 (n.s.) 
and  0.70 (p <  0.01), respectively/)* The + / — signs in 
colum ns 4 and 5 indicate w h e th e r  the  quality weights 
from the categoiy and difference m ethods are closer 
to the adjusted ( + ) or unad justed  ( - )  TTO quality 
weights. The quality weights from the categoiy scaling 
are closer to the unadjusted  TTO values for 11 of 13 
subjects (p <  0.02).
For the first seven subjects, substantial differences 
between unadjusted and adjusted quality weights larger
than 0.30 were found. For these  seven subjects, the  
corresponding quality weights from the categoiy scal­
ing were all closer to the seven u n ad ju s ted  TTO quality 
weights (p <  0.01).
As explained in the in troduction , the difference 
m ethod does not differentiate be tw een  the two TTO 
quality weights if these  two w eights fall on the sam e 
side of 0,5. In tha t case, NA (not applicable) appears  
in column 7 of table 3. For the  first seven subjects in 
table 3, the difference m e th o d  also agreed b e tte r  w ith  
the unad justed  TTO quality w eights for' four of the 
thus remaining five (n.s,) subjects.
We conclude that the ad justed  quality w eights from 
the TTO disagree w ith  the quality w eights from the 
categoiy scaling; the difference m easu rem en ts  tend  to 
disagree as well. The disagreement is p ronounced  w hen 
the adjustm ent is large, that is, larger than 0.3.
tO ur data show no evidence lor ¿i pow er relation between the 
categoiy scaling scores and the unadjusted TTO scores.
C O N JO IN T  M E A SU R E M E N T  A N D  
PROPORTIONAL H EU RISTICS
The regression betw een the  conjoint m easu rem en t 
and TTO equivalents show s a correlation of 0.94, (p <  
0.0001). The regression slope is 0.89, w ith  a s tan d a rd  
error of 0.04. As expected, the in te rcep t is no t signif­
icantly different from zero. A test for deviations of lin­
earity is not significant [F =  1.819, d f = (13,57), p  <  
0.06). Note that the linear relation is no t an artifact of 
averaging over subjects, as identical analyses of ind i­
vidual data also show  a linear relation betw een the 
CM and TTO equivalents. We conc lude  that o u r a s ­
sum ption that CM and TTO equivalents are linearly 
related is not d iscontinued  by o u r  data, though the 
power of the test may not have been  sufficient to do  
so. Nevertheless, the linear association is s trong  in the 
sense that it accounts for 88% of the  v iiriance..
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General Discussion
PREFERENCE REVERSALS F O R  M E T  HEALTH STATES
For a bad hea lth  state, m etastasized  breast cancer, 
50 of 86 subjects preferred (25,M) to (50,M). We found 
in the TTO test that the m ajority  of these subjects, 37 
of the 50, w anted  more hea lthy  life years for the longer 
duration of life w ith  m etastasized  cancer than  for the 
shorter one. Hence, the h ighest num ber of healthy 
years was assigned to the less preferred outcome. This 
shows that the TTO equivalents do not reflect the pref­
erences of these  37 subjects. These results entail a 
preference reversal.
It might be the  case tha t subjects initially preferred 
(25,M) to (50,M), bu t that this preference changed dur­
ing the experiment. This cou ld  explain the observed 
preference in the  TTO data. However, in Experiments 
1 and 2, we carefully elicited the prior preference of 
(25,M) over (50,M), and all subjects (but one) reaffirmed 
that preference at the en d  of the experiment, In Ex­
periment 3, the preferences betw een (25,M) and (50,M) 
were elicited after  the elicitation of the TTO equiva­
lents. Therefore, w e conclude th a t  a preference change 
does not underlie  our finding. We confronted seven 
subjects with their preference reversals. Six of the seven 
did not want to change the ir  answers at all! The re­
maining subject did change h e r  answers, bu t did not 
change them enough to alleviate the preference re­
versal. This persistence m akes the preference reversal 
seem genuine.
Our explanation for this preference reversal is as 
follows.9 For prophylactic m astectom y and /o r genetic 
counseling, the 50-year ou tcom e is always more at­
tractive than the  25-year outcom e. A m onotone heu­
ristic, that is, a heuristic th a t equates m ore healthy life 
years to the longer duration  in  inferior health, is p lau­
sible for these two health  states, If this heuristic is 
applied to the m etastasis h ea lth  state, this will give 
rise to the observed choice paradox. The compatibility 
principle17-20 reinforces this interpretation. It states 
that “stimulus com ponen ts  th a t are compatible with 
the response are weighted m o re  heavily than  those 
that are not.” In the TTO task, subjects strongly con­
centrate on the life-duration dim ension. According to 
the  compatibility principle, th e  life-duration d im en­
sion in the TTO question will receive a larger weight, 
while the weight for the h ea lth  state will diminish. 'The 
joint operation of the m o n o to n e  heuristic  and the 
compatibility princip le  is apparen tly  so strong that 
m ost subjects do not see th a t life duration should be 
evaluated negatively, in asm u ch  as (25,M) is preferred 
to (50,M). The m ono tone  heuris tic  can be specified as 
a proportional heuristic, w here , in a TTO question lor 
(Y,Q), a subject chooses X as a proportion  of Y. This 
follows because the  X/Y ratios observed for the (25,M) 
an d  (50,M) ou tcom es are th e  same. It is through the 
blind use of this p roportional heuristic  that preference
reversals occur. This blind use  is driven by the  com ­
patibility effect.
Nevertheless, the TTO quality weights X/Y are in­
consistent for these subjects in the sense that the  X/Y 
ratios for the (50,M) outcom e are the same an d  not 
less than  the  ratios of the (25,M) outcome. Thus, the 
X/Y ratios do not reflect that these subjects prefer (25,M) 
over (50,M). Our conclusion is that, for bad health states, 
one should ask unidim ensional preference questions 
such as “w hich  do you prefer: (5,M) or (10,M)?M When 
a subject prefers the shorter to the longer durations, 
then our data show that preference reversals are 
frequently observed. From the normative viewpoint of 
a rational preference theoiy, the TTO test should 
be abandoned beyond the m ost preferred duration  
for those subjects who indeed have a preference rever­
sal. This advise concurs with the  discussion in Suther­
land et aL,8 in which they say tha t “a failure to identify 
best and w orst outcomes for different time frames ..,  
may obscure the existence of a MET . . .  this could 
lead to erroneous interpretations of time preference 
curves__ "
One may ask w hether preference reversals m ay be 
found for real patients. We suspect that the answ er 
will be positive, because the proportional heuristic  is 
cognitive: cognitive effects on utility m easurem ent such 
as framing21“23 have been show n to be persis ten t in 
patients. We are pursuing this m atter further w ith  real 
patients and  for more realistic durations.
As an aside, in the TTO task, life duration is varied 
as a response measure, whereas in the  CM task the 
response is a simple preference. The compatibility ef­
fect predicts that subjects will weight the life-duration 
dimension more heavily in the TTO task as com pared  
with the CM task because in the TTO task, the re­
sponse is compatible w ith the life-duration d im ension . 
It is interesting to note that the TTO equivalents w ere 
indeed 10% larger than the CM equivalents; this find­
ing also agrees with and  confirms the compatibility 
effect.
COMPARISONS W ITH CATEGORY SCALING AND
For the 16 subjects selected in Experim ent 1, the 
unadjusted quality weights X/Y correlated significantly 
with the quality weights derived from category scaling. 
On the contraiy, the adjusted quality weights V(X)/V(Y) 
correlated less strongly with the category scaling 
weights. The weights with large ad justm ents in p a r­
ticular, disagreed strongly w ith the category scaling 
weights. W hen confronted w ith the ad justm ents , sev­
eral subjects complained that such  large positive a d ­
justments are unrealistic. The difference m e a su re ­
ments were also more in line w ith the u n a d ju s te d  TTO 
weights. We conclude that our data strongly suggest 
that for subjects who prefer (25,M) to (50,M), th e  X/Y 
quality weight shows more convergent validity w ith
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category scaling and, to a lesser extent, w ith  difference 
measurement. This supports ou r claim tha t these p a r ­
ticular subjects use a proportional heuristic.
HOW  W IDESPREAD IS TH E 
PROPORTIONAL HEURISTIC?
The preference reversal in inconsisten t subjects an d  
the support for the proportional heuristic in the p re ­
vious paragraph indicate that the inconsisten t s u b ­
jects use a proportional heuristic. One m ight argue 
that our dem onstration of deviant results after a d ­
justment in the “Comparison w ith categoiy scaling 
and difference m easurem ent” section is Rawed b e ­
cause nine of the 13 subjects in  Experim ent 1 w ere 
inconsistent (as registered in the last co lum n of table 
3); in that case, the argument continues, in the p re ­
vious section we selected subjects w ho use a p ro p o r­
tional heuristic to prove our po in t against ad justm ent. 
In this section, we put foiward the  conjecture that the  
proportional heuristic is not confined to inconsistent 
subjects.
The inconsistency of the TTO responses pertains 
only to our finding that inconsistent subjects prefered 
(25,M) to (50,M). This does not imply that these  s u b ­
jects used an atypical heuristic w ith  the TFO test. Now, 
for the metastasis health state, the noMET and  in co n ­
sistent:]: subjects, that is, 73 of 86 subjects, h a d  sim i­
larly-shaped TTO cuives for the m etastasis health  state 
and a constant proportional tradeoff fov durations longer 
than 5 years with metastasis (see table 2). Only the 13 
consistent subjects’ choices show ed X/Y ratios that 
decreased with duration. Therefore, given the similar 
structures of the TFO responses, as based on the co n ­
stant proportional tradeoff criterion, we have som e 
reason to believe that the noMET subjects u sed  a h e u ­
ristic similar to that used by the inconsistent subjects. 
If this is true, the inconsistent subjects may be u sed  
for the “comparisons with categoiy scaling and  dif­
ference m easurem ent.”
ADJUSTMENT, YES OR NO?
Should we adjust the quality weights from the TTO 
test for the feet that short-term life years are valued 
differently from long-term life years?2,4 The use of a 
proportional heuristic argues against adjustm ent, p ro ­
vided that the proportional heuristic occurs w ithou t 
a preference reversal. The absence of a preference re ­
versal supports the correctness of the preference th e ­
ory and thus the QALY models described in the in ­
troduction. There, we identified a quality weight of X/Y 
with no adjustment; V(X)/V(Y) w as identified w ith a d ­
justment. The proportional heuristic  leads in a natu ra l
way to the use of the ratio X/Y to characterize  the 
quality weight and, thus, forms a p lea against ad ju s t­
ment. Therefore, the  p roportional heuris tic  w ith o u t a 
preference reversal argues against ad ju stm en t. Re­
cently, Bleichrodt and  Johannes  son2'4 show ed  th a t the 
ranking of unad justed  1TO quality w eights agrees b e t­
ter w ith rank-ordered hea lth  profiles th a n  the ranking 
of adjusted quality weights. This finding agrees w ith  
our plea against ad justm ent. M ore data  are n eed ed  
that support the use  of a p roportional heuris tic  w ith ­
out a preference reversal.
C O N JO IN T  M E A SU R E M E N T
The proportional heuris tic  has im portan t co n se ­
quences for the  in te r r e la t io n  of CM. In CM, value 
functions are derived th a t m odel the  apprec ia tion  of 
life duration and  hea lth  states. These value functions 
depend  on the ordinal relations in the preferences. 
Unfortunately, ordinal relations do not un iquely  d e ­
term ine value functions: different value functions are 
strategically equivalent if they preseive the o rd er of 
preferences over the ou tcom es.12 In o u r  case, the  value 
functions from CM are equivalent up  to a linear or 
exponential transform .15 This raises the p rob lem  of 
pinpointing the correct value function in CM,
A general approach  to solving this p rob lem  is to 
investigate the relation between utility scales a n d  value 
functions derived from preferences, For instance, u til­
ity scales derived from gam bles w ere c o m p ared  w ith  
strength-of-preference scales from difference m ea­
surem ents by Barron et al.25 Maas a n d  W akker15 tran s­
formed the CM values lor du ra tion  so as to fit the  
gamble utility function for life dura tion . T he quality 
weights for the health  states are also affected by th is 
transformation. The m e th o d  of Maas and  W akker is 
similar to the ad justed  TTO test in the sense  th a t bo th  
m ethods transform  preference scales to utility scales 
via the function V(L), w here  V(L) deno tes  the  a p p re ­
ciation for life dura tion  an d  is ob ta ined  via the gam ble 
m ethod. In o ther w ords, b o th  m e th o d s  ad ju st W(Q) 
via V(X)/V(Y).
We propose a different solution. If one  accep ts  o u r  
conclusion that subjects u se  a p roportional heuris tic  
in the TFO test, th e n  the fact th a t a linear relation  
explains 88% of the variance be tw een  the  CM and  TTO 
equivalents suggests tha t the  sam e heuristic  is app lied  
in the CM m ethod. In tha t case, in te rm s of the  m u l­
tiplicative m odel (see the  in troduction), one  sh o u ld  
set V(L) = L. Consequently, the  quality  w eights for the  
health states in CM shou ld  be derived w ith  a function  
V(L) =  L for life du ra tion .§
$The terms inconsistent, consistent, and noMET are introduced 
in the Results section.
§A strict linear relationship between the CM and TFO equivalents 
is not possible because: 1) the CM and  TTO quality scales coincide 
at tlie endpoints death (maximal tradeoff) and perfect health (no 
tradeoffJ; and 2 ) the IT O  equivalents are larger than the CM equiv­
alents between the endpoints due to the compatibility effect.
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QUALITY-OF-LIFE M O D E L
Above, we suggest tha t a proportional heuristic ar­
gues against adjustm ent. This might be construed to 
mean that the QALY m odel for decision making should 
be L X W(Q), as described in the introduction. How­
ever, we want to m ake a distinction between 1) the 
descriptive model L X W(Q) for interpreting subjects' 
responses in the TTO test and  2) the normative model 
V(L) X W(Q), to be u se d  for quality-of-life modeling in 
decision making.
With a proportional heuristic, the ratio X/Y is the 
natural way to characterize the  quality weight. Indeed, 
this is formally equivalent to  using L X W(Q) as a 
descriptive model of the  subjects’ responses in TTO, 
Formally, in the descriptive model, using X/Y corre­
sponds with setting V(L) =  L in the TTO method. 
However, this does n o t m ean tha t life years are never 
discounted: actually, the  appreciation of life duration, 
as established via the  gambles, was nonlinear for 15 
of 17 subjects. Our results merely suggest that our 
subjects did not d iscoun t life years in the TTO test.
From a normative p o in t of view, discounting should 
be taken into account26 in  the  quality-of-life model as 
used  in a decision tree. We propose the following nor­
mative prescription: The duration  function V(L) should 
be elicited with an elicitation m ethod  that is sensitive 
to the discounting of life years such as the gamble 
m ethod of difference m easurem ent. If the TTO m ethod 
is chosen to elicit quality weights, then  the  best char­
acterization of W(Q) is X/Y, as follows from the de­
scriptive model. Finally, in the  QALY model for deci­
sion making, one appreciates (L,Q) by V(L] X X/Y. 
Likewise, if CM is used, the quality weights for Q should 
be derived with a function  V(L) =  L for life duration.
This normative p rescrip tion  V(L) X X/Y stands m id­
way between the ad justed  V(L) X V(X)/V(Y) and the 
unadjusted L X X/Y quality of life m odels. It has the 
advantage of preventing unrealistic positive adjust­
ments ofW(Q) w hen  nearby  life years are appreciated 
more than distant life years because we take the qual­
ity weight as X/Y and  n o t  as V(X)/V(Y). It also takes into 
account via V(L) that n o n lin ea r evaluations of life years 
exist. Once again, the  p ro p o sed  normative prescrip­
tion presumes that the  proportional heuristic is in­
deed as widespread as w e assume.
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